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Chevron Corporation v. Donziger, 768 F. 
Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
  
Anaeli C. Sandoval* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger1 is a claim brought by Chevron in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking 
damages and a preliminary injunction of a multibillion-dollar judgment that 
was entered against Chevron in an Ecuadorian provincial court.2 This 
complaint advances claims against fifty-six defendants who fall into four 
different categories: Steven Donziger and his law firm; Stratus Consulting, 
Inc. and two of its employees; four Ecuadorian individuals and entities; and 
indigenous peoples in the Amazonian rain forest (the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs, 
or “LAPs”).3 After the Ecuadorian court rendered the judgment in favor of 
the LAPs, Chevron filed a motion seeking clarification of certain aspects of 
the decision.4 Chevron seeks a preliminary injunction in the U.S. court to 
bar the enforcement of the judgment outside Ecuador pending either the 
resolution of this complaint on the merits or its prayer for declaratory 
judgment.5 The issue is whether “the judgment rendered in 2011, at the 
conclusion of a law suit begun in 2003, is foreclosed from recognition and                                                                                                                                 
 *  Class of 2013, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1.  Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting an 
injunction to bar enforcement of an Ecuadorian judgment outside of Ecuador). 
 2.  See id. at 597 (providing some preliminary background information on the status 
of the case in the District Court).  
 3.  See id. at 625 (describing the details of the defendants in this complaint). The 
Stratus employees consist of Douglas Beltman, an executive vice president, and Ann Maest, 
a managing scientist. Id. The four Ecuadorian individuals and entities, one way or another, 
have been a part of the original LAPs case in Ecuador—Pablo Fajardo, counsel of record in 
Ecuador; Amazon Defense Front (ADF), a non-profit organization that represents the 
interest of the LAPs; Selva Viva, an entity created to provide litigation funds; and Luis 
Yanza, who helps to lead both organizations. Id. 
 4.  See id. at 622 (outlining the procedure of filing a motion to seek clarification in 
Ecuador). During an appeal, Ecuadorian law requires the judgment stayed pending the 
decision of the intermediate appellate court. Id. at 621. Once decided, that decision can be 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Ecuador by filing a writ of cassation. Id. The critical part 
of this process is that if a judgment is upheld by the intermediate appellate court, it will be 
enforceable while the writ of cassation is pending before the Supreme Court. Id. Even 
though the party will have the option to request a stay from the intermediate court, if 
granted, it would be enforceable in Ecuador, but not necessarily outside Ecuadorian courts. 
Id. at 622.  
 5. See id. at 625 (listing the claims asserted by Chevron). 
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enforcement by virtue of the conditions during that period, not during 
1999–2000.”6  
 
II.  The Controversy that Started it All 
 
 This litigation originated with Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.7 Texaco 
Petroleum Company (“TexPet”),8 a subsidiary of Texaco, operated a 
petroleum concession for a consortium in the Oriente region of eastern 
Ecuador.9 The Aguinda case was a class action brought by a group of 
lawyers, including Steven Donziger, on behalf of citizens of the Ecuadorian 
rain forest.10 The complaint, which originated in a New York court, alleged 
pollution of the rain forest and sought equitable relief.11 While the Aguinda 
litigation was pending in New York, Texaco settled all of the pollution 
claims with the Republic of Ecuador.12  
 The dismissal of the complaint in the United States seemed to be a 
problem for the plaintiffs: At the time, Ecuador did not permit class actions 
or pretrial discovery, making a class action suit of this type impossible to 
pursue in Ecuador.13  Around this time, the lawyers, who had brought the 
original complaint in the United States, worked with Ecuadorian lawyers to 
draft what would become Ecuador’s Environmental Management Act of                                                                                                                                 
 6.  Id. at 616. 
 7.  Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “(1) [the] 
courts of Ecuador provided adequate alternative forum for citizens’ claims, and (2) [the] 
balance of private and public interest factors weighed strongly in favor of trial in Ecuadorian 
courts, warranting conditioned dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds”). When the 
complaint was originally brought to the New York District Court, Texaco motioned for 
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. Chevron, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 598. The District 
Court granted the motion and, the second time around, the Court of Appeals affirmed. See 
Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 470. 
 8.  Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 9.  See id. (laying out the background of Texaco’s former operations in Ecuador).  
 10. See id. (providing information on the original Aguinda case).  
 11. See id. at 597–98 (discussing the plaintiffs’ request for billions of dollars to 
“redress contamination of the water supplies and environment”). In essence, the complaint 
requested a U.S. court to require Texaco to perform remediation work within Ecuador.  Id.  
 12.  See id. at 598 (detailing the Texaco settlement). In 1994, TexPet entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding and, in 1995, signed a settlement agreement with the 
Republic of Ecuador (ROE) and Petroecuador in which TexPet agreed to perform specified 
remedial environmental work in exchange for a release of claims by the ROE. Id. Three 
years later, TexPet and ROE signed a final agreement, or the Final Release, in which ROE 
acknowledged that the Settlement had been fulfilled and “proceeded to release, absolve, and 
discharge TexPet and related companies, including its successors, ‘from any liability and 
claims for items related to the obligations assumed by TexPet’ in the Settlement.” Id. 
 13. See id. at 599 (discussing what claims the Ecuadorian court made available to the 
plaintiffs in 1999).  
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1999 (EMA).14 The EMA created a new private right of action or damages 
for the cost of remediation of environmental harms.15 In 2001, by a reverse 
triangular merger, Chevron became the holder of one-hundred percent of 
Texaco’s shares.16 The EMA provided the plaintiffs with a vehicle to sue 
Chevron and Texaco in Ecuador’s court system in 2003.17 The merger, and 
the 2003 complaint, began Chevron’s involvement with the suit.18 
 
III.  From Past to Present: Unfolding the Procedural History 
 
 In 2003, LAPs sued Chevron and Texaco in Lago Agrio, Ecuador, 
alleging environmental contamination by TexPet and Texaco in the years 
up to 1992.19 The complaint sought “remediation of alleged 
pollution, . . . demanded judgment requiring that the necessary work be 
done, and sought health improvement and medical monitoring of the 
inhabitants be done, at the expense of ‘the defendant.’”20  
 Between 2003 and 2011, while the case was being litigated in 
Ecuador, the Ecuadorian court system experienced an institutional crisis: 
with the appointment of President Correa, the court system seemed to 
deteriorate.21 Since President Correa’s re-election in 2008, “judges have 
been threatened with violence, removed, and/or prosecuted when they ruled 
against the government’s interest.”22 Reports by the World Bank and the 
U.S. State Department confirmed that Ecuador’s judicial branch was no                                                                                                                                 
 14. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 599–600 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(providing some background on the EMA of 1999).  
 15.  See id. (providing a more detailed description of the EMA and the reasons for its 
adoption).  
 16.  Reverse triangular mergers prevent undeveloped liabilities from flowing into an 
acquiring corporation. See id. at 600 n.40. Since the corporation is kept alive, it is 
responsible for its own liabilities. See id. Keepep, Inc., a subsidiary of Chevron, merged with 
and into Texaco. Id. at 600. Keepep’s stock, owned directly and indirectly by Chevron, was 
converted into new shares of Texaco, which lead to Chevron holding one-hundred percent of 
Texaco’s shares. Id. Since Texaco was the surviving corporation, Texaco remained 
responsible for its own liabilities. Id.  
 17. See id. (discussing the court’s inference as to why the EMA was drafted and 
enacted).  
 18. See id. (discussing the theory under which Chevron would assume Texaco and 
TexPet’s liabilities). 
 19.  Id. (describing the 2003 complaint against Chevron and Texaco). The complaint 
alleges that Texaco was responsible for the activities of TexPet and, because of the 2001 
merger, Chevron is responsible for Texaco and TexPet liabilities. Id. 
 20.  Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 21.  During this period, then-President Gutierrez replaced 27 of the 31 judges of the 
Supreme Court with new justices. Id. at 617. In 2005, he declared a state of emergency and 
removed all of the Supreme Court justices, leaving Ecuador without a Supreme Court for 
just shy of a year—all while the LAPs’ case was pending in Ecuador. Id.  
 22.  Id. at 618. 
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longer acting impartially, as they were subject to constant threats and 
pressures.23 
 The Lago Agrio court issued its multibillion-dollar judgment 
against Chevron in February 2011.24 The court held that Texaco was 
responsible for damages caused during its time of operation in Ecuador and, 
because of the merger, that liability passed to Chevron.25 The value of the 
judgment surpassed $18 billion dollars.26 Upon the Lago Agrio court 
issuing the judgment, Chevron filed a motion seeking clarification of the 
decision.27  
Under Ecuadorian law, parties have three days from when the 
clarification is issued to file an appeal.28 During the time the clarification is 
pending, the judgment will not be enforceable in Ecuador’s courts.29 Lack 
of enforceability of the judgment in Ecuador, however, does not mean the 
same for courts outside of Ecuador.30 With the conjecture that LAPs would 
pursue enforcement of the judgment outside the courts of Ecuador, Chevron 
took the preventive measure of seeking an injunction in the New York 
District Court.31 Based on the LAPs’ Enforcement Plan, Chevron’s 
assumptions were warranted.32  
 
A.  The Enforcement Plan 
 
                                                                                                                                
 23.  See id. at 620 (providing the results of both reports); World Bank, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators for Ecuador, available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_country.asp; U.S. Dep't of State, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007, 2008, and 2009, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136111.htm.. 
 24. See Chevron, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (discussing the Lago Agrio’s judgment 
against Chevron in 2011).  
 25.  See id. at 620–21 (adding to the court’s conclusion that “(1) it was competent to 
hear the complaint, [and] (2) the settlement between the ROE and TexPet and Texaco did 
not bind the LAPs”).   
 26. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(breaking down the multi-billion dollar judgment granted by the Lago Agiro’s court). 
 27. See id. at 622 (detailing the next steps Chevron took after the Ecuadorian judgment 
was awarded). 
 28.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Chevron, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (discussing the appellate remedies offered to 
Chevron in Ecuador).  
 30. See id. at 622 (“[A] stay in Ecuador would not necessarily stay proceedings 
outside Ecuador.”). 
 31. See id. at 626 (outlining the proceedings to date). 
 32. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 622–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(discussing the LAPs’ enforcement plan). 
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Before the judgment was rendered in Ecuador, ADF33 issued a press 
release stating, “if the plaintiffs win a judgment against Chevron in 
Ecuador’s courts, they plan to move ‘expeditiously’ to seize Chevron’s 
assets in the U.S. and other countries.”34 The purpose of the enforcement 
plan is to “seek to enforce the judgment ‘quickly, if not immediately, on 
multiple enforcement fronts in the United State and abroad.’”35 From an 
action this widespread, the LAPs hope to gain enough leverage against 
Chevron to obtain a favorable settlement on a pre-judgment basis.36 
Chevron filed this motion in the United States seeking preliminary 
injunction to bar the defendant’s from enforcing the judgment outside of 
Ecuador since it may be possible for LAPs to enforce the judgment in 
courts all over the world,37 even while Chevron’s motion seeking 
clarification is pending in Ecuador. The multiplicity of suits would put a 
strain on Chevron to litigate the enforceability of the Ecuadorian judgment 
in multiple proceedings.38 As the court expressed, this strain would make 
Chevron vulnerable to LAPs’ enforcement plan and threaten Chevron with 
irreparable harm.39 In addition, the court determined the threat of harm that 




                                                                                                                                 
 33.  ADF is a non-profit organization and a defendant to the complaint filed in the 
United States by Chevron. Id. at 621. 
 34.  Id. at 623 (quoting a press release issued by Amazon Watch and Frente de la 
Amazonia on September 24, 2009). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See id. (“Assets may be attached by way of an ex parte proceeding . . . making that 
an extremely attractive option for obtaining leverage early in a case.”).  
 37.  See id. (discussing the extent of Chevron’s operations).  
 38. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(discussing whether Chevron’s case was appropriate for declaratory relief).  
 39.  See id. at 627 (outlining the four different injuries that Chevron risks with the 
LAPs’ enforcement plan). Chevron would be subjected to (1) “the coercive effect of multiple 
proceedings and the risk of asset seizures and attachments,” (2) “the cost, distractions and 
other burdens of defending itself in multiple fora, probably simultaneously,” (3) “asset 
seizures and attachments” that “would disrupt Chevron’s business and harm its reputation 
and its goodwill,” and (4) the inability to retrieve funds from the LAPs if the judgment is 
ultimately deemed invalid. Id. 
 40.  See id. at 629 (conveying the urgency of granting Chevron’s motion for 
preliminary injunction). Chevron’s motion for clarification is currently pending with the 
court in Ecuador. Id. However, once the court renders the clarification, Chevron will only 
have three days to file an appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in Ecuador. Id. It seems 
a fair assumption, based on all the information presented and the condition of the judicial 
system in Ecuador, to conclude that the court of appeals will affirm the provincial court’s 
decision leaving the judgment enforceable everywhere. Id.  





B.  Justice Kaplan’s Opinion 
 
1.  Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
 
In Hilton v. Guyot,41 the Supreme Court of the United States expressed 
a limit toward the recognition and enforcement of foreign country money 
judgments.42 In that case, the court indicated that enforcement and 
recognition may be denied “where the party resisting enforcement shows 
that there was: ‘prejudice in the [rendering] court, or in the system of laws 
under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other 
special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full 
effect.’”43 In the present case, the court applied the federal Declaratory 
Judgment Act44 and New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money-
Judgments Recognition Act45 to determine whether or not it would 
recognize and enforce the Ecuadorian judgment.46  
In reference to whether Ecuador provided Chevron with an impartial 
tribunal, the court evaluated all of the evidence before it, including 
Ecuador’s judicial structure and stability during the period the case was 
pending.47 There was documentation and affirmation that Ecuador’s judicial 
system had been influenced by corruption and political interference.48 In 
addition, the corruption seemed to increase with President Correa’s 
election.49 The President seemed to have control over the Ecuadorian courts                                                                                                                                 
 41.  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (concluding that international judgments 
should be upheld unless obtained by fraud). 
 42.  Id. at 114. 
 43.  Chevron, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 632 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 123 
(1895)). The Third Restatement supports the view that even if a judgment was rendered in a 
court with an impartial tribunal, the recognition and enforcement may be denied if “the 
judgment was obtained by fraud.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(2)(c) (2011). 
 44.  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 
 45.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301–09 (McKinney 2012). 
 46. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(explaining how the state and federal statutes would be applicable).  
 47. See id.  at 633–34 (detailing the court’s analysis of Chevron’s claim that Ecuador 
does not provide impartial tribunals).  
 48. See id. at 635 (noting that numerous independent commentators were quoted in the 
Alvarez Report discussing Ecuador’s troubled legal system). 
 49. See id. at 634 (elaborating on Ecuador’s judicial system and President Correa’s 
impact on it).  
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with some evidence that judges have been threatened and pressured to favor 
the government’s interest.50  His influence on Ecuador’s judicial system 
seems correlative with his expressed interest in LAPs.51 The court 
determined that “Chevron thus is likely to prevail on its contention that the 
Ecuadorian judgment in this case ‘was rendered under a system which does 
not provide impartial tribunals or procedure compatible with the 
requirement of due process of law . . . .’”52 
 In regards to the Ecuadorian judgment being procured by fraud, the 
court found that the LAPs had submitted a forged expert report to the 
Ecuadorian Court.53 It was also determined that the LAPs’ effort in 
“cleansing”54 the original report was also fraudulent.55  This evidence was 
sufficient to cast serious doubts as to the merits of the judgment as well as 
the Ecuadorian proceedings.56 
 
2.  Claim for Preliminary Injunction 
 
Chevron is ultimately contesting the Ecuadorian judgment and sought 
a preliminary injunction to bar the enforcement of the judgment outside 
Ecuador.  As the Supreme Court has said:  
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to 
preserve the relative position of the parties until a trial on 
the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose, and 
given the haste that is often necessary if those positions are 
to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customarily 
granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and 
evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.57 
                                                                                                                                
 50.  See id. at 633–34 (providing examples of recent cases where President Correa’s 
influence and pressure was evident).  
 51. See id. at 634 (discussing President Correa’s explicit support for the LAPs lawsuit 
against Chevron).  
 52.  Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 53.  See id. (explaining how counsel for the LAPs had a ghostwriter prepare a report 
that it submitted to the court in Ecuador as evidence of Chevron’s environmental impact on 
the rain forest). Counsel also misrepresented to the court its relationship with the 
ghostwriter. Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  See id. at 636–37 (discussing how the “cleansed” reports relied heavily upon the 
initial Cabrera report which itself was tainted). 
 56. See id. at 634 (“[I]t is reasonable to infer, at least at this preliminary stage, that this 
is the type of highly politicized case that has not received, and will not receive, fair and 
impartial treatment in the Ecuadorian courts.”). 
 57.  Id. at 596 (quoting Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). 
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Using the Supreme Court’s explanation of preliminary injunction as 
guidance, the court granted Chevron’s motion.58 The court determined that 
the culmination of evidence significantly threatened Chevron with 
imminent irreparable harm.59 Sufficient documentation was provided to cast 
serious doubts as to the impartiality of the Ecuadorian tribunal and the 
procurement of fraud of the Ecuadorian judicial system.60 The court 
concluded that the evidence presented was ample to meet the burden of 
granting a motion for preliminary injunction.61  
 
C.  Future Implications 
 
Multiple actions have taken place since the New York District Court 
granted Chevron’s motion for preliminary injunction. First, in January 
2012, the Ecuadorian intermediate court affirmed the judgment from 
Ecuador’s provincial court.62 This means that, in Ecuador, clarification was 
given, Chevron appealed the judgment to the intermediate court, and 
judgment was affirmed.63 This means that currently, LAPs can enforce the 
judgment all over the world, including Ecuador.64 Second, in accordance 
with the motion for preliminary injunction that was granted by the New 
York District Court, LAPs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit.65 On January 26, 2012, the Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court’s motion and remanded the case with instruction to dismiss.66 
The Court of Appeals explained that Chevron relied on New York’s 
Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act to support its 
preliminary injunction motion.67 The Recognition Act is not applicable to a                                                                                                                                 
 58.  See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(explaining that, even though the court granted Chevron’s motion for preliminary injunction, 
it did so against all defendants except Stratus Consulting, Inc., Douglas Beltman, and Ann 
Maest). 
 59. See id. at 626–29 (providing the court’s analysis in determining how and why 
Chevron is threatened with immediate and irreparable injury).   
 60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 62. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (providing some 
of the most recent developments of the case in the Ecuadorian courts). 
 63. See id. at 237 (noting that the Ecuadorian intermediate court upheld the trial 
court’s ruling on Jan. 3, 2012). 
 64. See id. at 246 (stating that the LAPs can seek enforcement of the Ecuadorian 
judgment in any jurisdiction where Chevron has assets). 
 65. See id. at 234 (providing the basis for the LAPs’ appeal and the Court’s evaluation 
of that appeal).  
 66.  See id. (reversing the order and remanding the case to the lower court). 
 67. See id. at 237‒42 (discussing Chevron’s initial action in the lower court and 
providing an explanation for the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition 
Act). 
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preemptive suit by a putative debtor.68 Since LAPs’ counsel has not 
initiated enforcement of the judgment in New York, or in any other court, 
the Act does not permit Chevron to file a preemptive suit.69 As of this latest 
decision, Chevron will have to wait until LAPs’ counsel initiates 
enforcement of the judgment before seeking preliminary injunction under 
New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition 
Act.70 In attempting to use all of the tools at its disposal, Chevron has also 
tried to block the lawsuit by appealing to an arbitration tribunal in The 
Hague.71 
Assume that Chevron’s attorneys cannot find a loophole for the 
courts to affirmatively grant a preliminary injunction, or they decide to play 
defense and let LAP’s counsel make the first move. If LAPs tries to enforce 
the Ecuadorian judgment in the United States, the question then becomes 
whether Chevron’s motion for preliminary injunction would be granted. 
The court in Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo72 did not answer this question.73 
However, current case law exists to support a decision in Chevron’s favor.74  
 First, as the Naranjo court pointed out, “the burden may be on the 
would-be judgment-creditors themselves to establish that the judgment was 
not the procured from an inadequate judicial system.”75 This means that, if 
LAP’s counsel decided to enforce the foreign judgment, they would have 
the burden of proving that the mandatory exceptions to New York’s 
Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act did not 
apply.76 
In addition to LAPs bearing this burden, there is case law that seems 
to support the court in granting the preliminary in Chevron’s favor: In                                                                                                                                 
 68.  Id. 
 69. See id. at 234 (summarizing the court’s reasoning in deciding to vacate the 
injunction).   
 70. See id. at 245 (concluding that a plaintiff must instead “wait for the putative 
judgment-creditor to bring an enforcement action”). 
 71. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 2012 
(providing a third-party perspective on the history of this case and assessing whether 
Donziger has taken the litigation too far).   
 72. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that there was no 
basis under New York's Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act for an 
injunction until Ecuadorian judgment-creditors affirmatively sought to enforce their 
judgment in a court governed by New York or similar law). 
 73. See id. at 241 (stating that the court explicitly holds “no opinion” as to whether 
Ecuadorian courts comport with the international standards of fairness and legitimacy 
required by international comity). 
 74. See, e.g., Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
 75. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 241 n.15.  
 76. See id. (“[T]he burden may be on the would-be judgment-creditors themselves to 
establish that the judgment was not the procured from an inadequate judicial system”).  
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Osorio v. Dole Food Co.,77 Nicaraguan citizens tried to enforce a $97 
million judgment under the Florida Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act in the United States District Court.78 
The Nicaragua citizens had worked on banana plantations for twelve years 
during which they were exposed to an agricultural pesticide.79 The 
judgment was rendered by a trial court in Nicaragua under Special Law 364 
enacted by the Nicaraguan legislature in 2000.80 The American court 
concluded that “the legal regime set up by Special Law 364 and applied in 
this case does not comport with the ‘basic fairness’ that the ‘international 
concept of due process’ requires.”81 Taking the facts that surround 
Ecuadorian court’s decision—including evidence of fraud, illegal activities, 
and lack of due process—and applying the court’s analysis in Osorio, I 
would propose that any court would grant Chevron’s motion for 
preliminary injunction.  
 Even still, international comity is important for preserving an 
international system of justice.82 When courts render decisions in cases 
involving foreign country money judgments, especially when they entail 
multibillion-dollar judgments and intense media coverage, they must tread 
lightly so as not to disrupt the United States’ relationship with other 
countries. In a case such as this, where there is evidence of fraud and illegal 
activities surrounding the judgment, courts should read the exceptions to 
the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act liberally 
and prevent recognition and enforcement of suspect foreign judgments 
within its own borders. This type of decision will help promote foreign 
courts to consider international due process in making their decisions, 
which would further international comity.  
                                                                                                                                
 77. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying 
recognition of a Nicaraguan judgment because (1) the Nicaraguan court lacked jurisdiction, 
(2) the Nicaraguan court violated international concepts of due process so as to mandate 
non-recognition of judgment, (3) due process violations warranted non-recognition on public 
policy grounds, and (4) evidence demonstrated that Nicaragua lacked impartial tribunals). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 1314‒15 (discussing Nicaragua’s Special Law 364). 
 81. Id. at 1345. 
 82. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 242–44 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing 
the court’s opinion of international comity and the critical role it plays in New York’s 
Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act). 
